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Abstract This paper develops a simple method for quantifying banks’ exposures
to large (negative) shocks in a forward-looking manner. The method is based on
estimating banks’ share prices sensitivities to (market) put options and does not
require the actual observation of tail risk events. We find that estimated (excess)
tail risk exposures for U.S. Bank Holding Companies are negatively correlated
with their share price beta, suggesting that banks which appear safer in normal
periods are actually more crisis prone than their beta would suggest. We also study
the determinants of banks’ tail risk exposures and find that their key drivers are
uninsured deposits and non-traditional activities that leave assets on banks’ balance
sheets.
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1 Introduction
A systemic banking crisis—a situation in which many banks are in distress at the
same time—can induce large costs for the economy. The task of supervisors and
regulators is to avoid and mitigate, as far as possible, such crises. For this they need
advance information about how banks are exposed to shocks to the economy. This
allows them to identify weak banks and put them under increased scrutiny but also
to monitor general risks in the financial system. When evaluating the exposure of
banks it is also of paramount importance to distinguish between exposures to normal
market shocks, and exposures to large shocks. For example, a financial institution
that follows a tail risk strategy (such as writing protection in the CDS market) may
appear relatively safe in normal periods as it earns steady returns but may actually
be very vulnerable to significant downturns in the economy.
Supervisors and regulators obtain their information to a large extent from infor-
mation generated by the bank itself, such as its accounts. While these sources are a
crucial ingredient of the evaluation process they are not free from drawbacks. For
example, most of this information is under the discretion of banks and may be used
strategically.1 Moreover, this data is typically backward looking and available only at
relatively low frequency. Accounting information also misses important aspects such
as informal knowledge (e.g., CEO reputation) or information contained in analysts’
reports.
In recent years there has been growing interest in using market-based measures
of bank risk. This is on the back of evidence that market signals contain valuable
information about banks’ risks (see Flannery (1998, 2001) for surveys). Some of the
measures explicitly take into account systemic and tail risk aspects (e.g., Acharya
et al. 2009; Adrian and Brunnermeier 2009; De Jonghe 2010). They typically use
information from historical tail risk events to compute realized tail risk exposures
over a certain period.
In this paper we develop a forward-looking measure of bank tail risk. We define
a bank’s (systemic) tail risk as its exposure to a large negative market shock. We
measure this exposure by estimating a bank’s share price sensitivity to changes in
far out-of-the-money put options on the market, correcting for market movements
themselves. As these options only pay out in very adverse scenarios, changes in their
prices reflect changes in the perceived likelihood and severity of market crashes.
Banks that show a high sensitivity to such put options are hence perceived by the
market as being severely affected should such a crash materialize. As this sensitivity
reflects perceived exposures to a hypothetical crash, it is truly forward-looking in
nature. This property is important to the extent that bank risks change quickly and
hence historical tail risk exposures become less informative. Another advantage of
this method is that it does not require the actual observation of any crashes, as the
method relies on changes in their perceived likelihood.
1For evidence on such strategic use see, for example, Wall and Koch (2000) and Hasan and Wall
(2004) for the reporting of loan losses and Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bushman and Williams
(2009) for the provisioning of loan losses. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) also provide evidence that
banks have used accounting discretion to overstate the value of their distressed assets in the current
crisis.
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We use our methodology to estimate tail risk exposures of U.S. bank holding
companies. We find that the estimated exposures are inversely related to their
CAPM beta. Since our methodology estimates tail risk over and above beta risk,
this implies that low beta-banks have more tail risk than their beta would suggest.
Thus, banks which appear safe in normal times are actually more exposed to a
crash. Conversely, of course, high beta banks have lower tail exposure than their
normal risk suggests. In other words, banks’ risk exposures converge in the tails.
This has interesting implications for financial regulation and we discuss various
interpretations of this finding in the paper.
We also use our methodology to understand the main drivers of bank tail risk.
Understanding these drivers is important for regulators as it gives them information
about which activities should be encouraged and which not. There is so far very little
research on this question (a notable exception is De Jonghe 2010). Our main findings
are that variables which proxy for traditional banking activities (such as lending)
are associated with lower perceived tail risk. Several non-traditional activities, on
the other hand, are perceived to contribute to tail risk. In particular, we find that
securities held for-sale, trading assets and derivatives used for trading purposes are
associated with higher tail risk. These findings are consistent with the experience of
the crisis of 2008 and 2009. Interestingly, securitization, asset sales and derivatives
used for hedging are not associated with an increase in tail risk exposure. This
suggests that a transfer of risk itself is not detrimental for tail risk, but that non-
traditional activities that leave risk on the balance sheet are. On the liability side we
find that leverage itself is not related to tail risk but that large time deposits (which
are typically uninsured) are. We also find that perceived tail risk falls with size, which
is indicative of bail-out expectations due to too-big-to-fail policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review
existing measures of tail risk. Section 3 develops the methodology for measuring tail
risk exposure using put option sensitivities. Section 4 contains the estimation of tail
risks. Section 5 studies the determinants of tail risk. Section 6 concludes.
2 Existing tail risk measures
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) has for many years been the standard measure used for risk
management. VaR is defined as the worst loss over a given holding period within
a fixed confidence level.2 A shortcoming of the VaR is that it disregards any loss
beyond the VaR level. The expected shortfall (ES) is an alternative risk measure
that addresses this issue. The ES is defined as the expected loss conditional on the
losses exceeding the VaR level. Another frequently used measure is Moody’s KMV.
Essentially, Moody’s KMV is a distance to default measure that is turned into an
expected default probability with the help of a large historical dataset on defaults.3
2See Standard & Poors (2005) for a general overview and Jorion (2006) for a more comprehensive
treatment.
3(Subordinated) debt and CDS spreads are an alternative and attractive measure of a bank’s default
risk. A shortcoming of these measures is that these spreads are not available for many banks (in the
case of CDS spreads) and often not very liquid (in the case of bonds).
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While these measures focus on individual bank risk, there has been a growing
interest in recent years in systemic measures of bank risk. One strand of the
literature focuses on tail-betas (e.g., De Jonghe 2010). This concept applies extreme
value theory to derive predictions about an individual bank’s value in the event
of a very large (negative) systematic shock. Loosely speaking, this method uses
information from days where stock market prices have fallen heavily and considers
the covariation with a bank’s share price on the same day. It thus focuses on realized
covariances conditional on large share price drops. A difficulty encountered when
applying this method is that tail risk observations are rarely observed, and hence a
large number of observations are needed to get accurate estimates (De Jonghe (2010)
suggests at least six years of daily data).
Acharya et al. (2009) develop a measure similar to the concept of market
dependence, which is based on expected shortfalls instead of betas. They propose
measuring the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), which is defined as the average
loss by an institution when the market reaches a certain quantile of its left tail.
Huang et al. (2010) propose a related measure focusing instead on a threshold loss
for a portfolio of large banks as the tail risk event. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009)
consider a different aspect of systemic risk. They estimate the contribution of each
institution to the overall system risk. A bank’s CoVaR is defined as the VaR of
the whole financial sector conditional on the bank being at its own VaR level. The
bank’s marginal contribution to the overall systemic risk is then measured as the
difference between the bank’s CoVaR and the unconditional financial system VaR.
An advantage of the CoVaR is that it is relatively simple to estimate, as it is based
on quantile regressions. In terms of its informational properties it is similar to the tail
risk beta in that it focuses on realized tail risk.
Our measure is most similar to the tail risk betas as we also measure bank expo-
sures to large market swings. A difference that is important for the interpretation of
the estimates, however, is that while the tail risk beta relates to large daily market
drops, we estimate exposures to a large prolonged downturn in the market (e.g.,
several months).
There is literature on hedge funds performance which uses a methodology similar
to ours. This literature estimates tail exposures for various styles of hedge funds with
a non-linear market factor that takes the shape of an out-of-the-money put option
(see, for example, Agarwal and Naik 2004). However, the focus of this literature
is different. While we are interested in estimated tail risk exposures per se (i.e.,
regulators want to know which banks are more exposed to tail risk), the hedge
fund literature looks at whether tail risk exposures can be used to forecast fund
performance.
3 Measuring tail risk using put option sensitivities
In this section we present our methodology for measuring banks’ tail risk exposures.
We define the latter to be the bank’s exposure to a general market crash (that is, a
severe downturn in the economy). If the market crashes, a bank may suffer large,
simultaneous losses on its assets, which may push it close to or into bankruptcy.
Crucially, the extent to which it is exposed to crashes may differ from its normal
market sensitivity. Consider two banks, A and B. Bank A invests mostly in traditional
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banking assets such as, for example, loans to businesses and households. Moreover, it
invests in assets that are mainly exposed to normal period risk, such as, for example,
junior tranches of securitization products (which lose value for modest increases in
defaults, but are insensitive to defaults that go beyond the first loss level). In addition
to these assets, bank A insures itself against default by buying protection on its assets
(such as by buying credit default swaps on its loans). Bank A’s equity value will thus
depend less on the market in times of crisis, compared to normal times.
Bank B follows a different business strategy. It invests in traditional assets as well.
However, in addition, it also follows investment strategies that return a small and
steady payoff in normal periods but incur large losses when the market crashes.
Examples of such a strategy is selling protection in the credit default swap (CDS)
market or buying senior tranches of securitization products (which lose value only
when all other tranches have already incurred a total loss). Thus, even though bank
B’s equity value may behave similarly to bank A’s in normal periods, it tends to fall
relatively more when the market crashes.
We next describe our method. For this we consider the economy’s representative
firm (the “market”). We suppose the firm exists for one period only and that its
(stochastic) next period equity value is denoted with x. Similarly, we consider a bank
with next period equity value y. We assume for the relationship between the equity









)γ if x < x
(1)
When x ≥ x, the bank’s equity value has thus a market dependence equal to the one
of a firm with a beta of β (that is, the bank’s return is β times the market return).
However, for x < x, the bank’s equity value additionally depends on the relative
shortfall of the market to x, x−xx (∈ [0, 1]). For γ > 0 its equity value will be more
sensitive to the market, hence the bank has tail risk over and above the normal
period exposure (as expected for Bank B), while for γ < 0 we have the opposite case
(Bank A). Only in the case of γ = 0 does the bank’s tail not differ from its normal
period risk.
Since tail risk realizations (x < x) are rarely observed, our estimation relies on
changes in perceived tail risk, which we will measure through changes in put options
prices. For this consider a put option with strike price x that is deep out-of-the-money
(x is hence a tail risk realization). We have for the pay-off from this put
p(x) =
{
0 if x ≥ x
x − x if x < x (2)






p + x . (3)
Percentage changes in the bank’s equity values ( dy(x)y ) thus relate to percentage
changes in the market ( dxx ), giving the standard β-effect. Additionally, they also
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relate to relative changes in the value of the option, dpp+x ,
4 arising from tail risk
exposure.
In our empirical implementation we will identify tail risk sensitivities (γ in
Eq. 3) by adding a put option (on the market) to a standard market regression and
interpreting the sign of the put option coefficient. Tail risk sensitivities will thus be
estimated through changes in put option prices, which (loosely speaking) arise from
changes in either the likelihood of a market crash or its severity.5
3.1 A discussion of the methodology
We believe that this method has several attractive features. First, the method is
forward-looking in nature, that is, it captures expected tail risk exposure at banks.
This contrasts with other popular methods for measuring tail risk, such as tail
risk betas or the CoVAR. These methods essentially compute correlations (or
covariation) of banks with the market (or other banks) at days of large share price
drops. They thus draw inferences from historical tail risk distributions and hence
measure realized tail risk. The difference between forward and backward-looking
measures is likely to be limited when banks only undergo small changes in their risks
over time, but is potentially important in a dynamically evolving financial system.
Second, our measure identifies banks’ tail risk exposure through changes in
expected market tail risk, as measured by put option prices. This has the advantage
that for our estimation we do not need tail risk events to materialize. Such events,
by definition, occur only very infrequently and hence it is difficult to estimate their
properties. Existing measures that rely on the historical distribution of tail risk events
reduce this problem by relying on a large time series and by looking at modest tail
risk realizations that occur more frequently. Our method allows the measurement of
exposure to extreme forms of tail risk (for this one simply includes a very far out-of-
the-money put option).
Since we estimate exposures to market crashes, our measure captures system tail
risk exposure. This is desirable since externalities from banking failures are typically
associated with system events, and not isolated bank failures. It should, however, be
kept in mind that a bank that has a low estimated systematic tail risk may still be
individually very risky to the extent that it pursues activities that are uncorrelated
with the market. In addition, one should also keep in mind that market risk is
not identical to banking sector risk. Even though banks’ market exposures have
probably increased in recent decades, credit risk is still the major source of risk for
banks. However, market and credit exposures are highly correlated in practice: when
economic conditions deteriorate, the default risk of firms increases and stock values
decline at the same time. For example, during our sample period the correlation
4The correct term here is indeed dpp+x and not, as one might think,
dp
p . The bank-market relationship
consistent with dpp would be y = x
β
(x−x)γ for x < x as one can easily verify, which is not a sensible one
as for x = x the denominator would then be infinite.
5The estimation of γ is akin to estimating the factor-loadings in the asset pricing literature (see,
for instance, Ang et al. (2006) and the references therein). While in the asset pricing literature the
factor loadings are often used to predict returns in a second step, we are interested here in the cross-
sectional distribution of the factor-loadings. More precisely, we propose using the cross-sectional
variation to identify banks that are perceived as being prone to a market crash.
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between the S&P 500 and the CDX crossover index was −0.77. Due to this high
correlation, our estimates will (indirectly) also capture credit risks at banks.6
In our empirical implementation of Eq. 3 we measure tail risk exposures by the
(negative) coefficient of a put-option return (γ ) in a regression on bank stock returns.
This, however, is in a regression where we also separately control for the market
return. Conditional on the market, a key driver of put-option returns is market
volatility. We can thus expect the γ to give us similar information as the (negative)
coefficient in a regression of bank returns on market volatility.7 This provides us
with an alternative interpretation of the γ . If a bank is symmetrically exposed to
upwards and downwards movements in the market, an increase in volatility will not
affect its value and the γ should be zero. However, if a bank is more exposed to
downward than to upward movements (e.g., Bank B), its value will decrease when
volatility increases. It then obtains a positive γ . The tail-risk estimate can thus also
be interpreted as a measure of how much more a bank is exposed to downturns than
to upturns. Total tail risk is then a combination of the symmetric dependence on the
market (given by the standard β-risk) and the asymmetric sensitivity to downturns
(the γ -risk).
It should be noted that our measure, like other market-based measures, is net of
any bailout expectations. If, for example, markets anticipate that governments may
bail out certain banks (for example because they are too-big-to-fail) then these banks
may have a low perceived tail risk even if their underlying activities are relatively
risky (Kane (1985), for example, shows that the expected value of these bail-out
subsidies can be significant). Thus, while our estimates are important for regulators
and supervisors in that they quantify a bank’s effective failure risk, there are less
suitable for being used as a base for regulation that aims at reducing risk-shifting (for
example, by conditioning capital requirements on tail risk exposures).
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
We collect daily data on bank share prices and the S&P 500 (our proxy for the
market) for the period 4 October 2005 until 26 September 2008 from Datastream.
Put option data on the S&P 500 for the same period is from IVolatility.8 In addition,
6An alternative to using put-options on the market are senior tranches of securitization products.
These tranches only lose value in extreme circumstances and hence represent tail credit risk.
However, the pricing of such tranches in financial markets is rather imperfect at present; hence they
are not suitable for estimating tail exposures.
7The two coefficients will obviously not provide identical information since put-option prices
(conditional on market returns) can also change due to other factors, such as interest rates, dividends
and (most importantly in our context) the skewness of the distribution. Overall, it is preferable to use
put-options (instead of volatility) as regressor as this will also capture variations in tail risk arising
from changes in skewness.
8We also considered using put options on a banking index (the BKX index) instead of the market.
There are two disadvantages to this. First, the banking sector index by itself will already reflect tail
risk in the financial system, thus the interpretation of the γ -estimates is not straightforward. Second,
put option prices on the index are fairly illiquid.
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various balance sheet data are collected from the FR Y-9C Consolidated Financial
Statements for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). We focus on U.S. BHCs which
are classified as commercial banks and for which data is fully available. We focus on
the BHC instead of the commercial bank itself, as typically it is the BHC that is listed
on the stock exchange. Excluded are those banks whose share price change is zero
in more than 10% of the cases in order to mitigate problems arising from illiquidity.
Foreign banks (even when listed in the U.S.) and pure investment banks are also
excluded. The final sample contains 209 Bank Holding Companies.
An important question is the choice of the option strike price. Ideally we would
choose an option such that on each day it represents the same crash probability.
Simply taking an option with a constant strike price is hence not appropriate as
market prices change over time and hence the moneyness of the option will change.
Taking the strike price to be a (fixed) fraction of the S&P500 is also not desirable as
this ignores that the likelihood of tail risk realizations is also driven by the volatility.
We hence decided to construct a series of options such that their option price does
not vary. Specifically, each day we adjust the strike of the option such that the
previous day price of the options is fixed over time.
For this we use an option price of 0.5$, which translates into an implied strike
that was on average 33% below the S&P 500 during our sample period.9 We have
checked the S&P500 over the last 25 years and have found three periods with stock
market declines of this magnitude: the 1987 stock market crash (maximum decline:
32%), the burst of the dotcom bubble (maximum decline: 23%) and the subprime
crisis (maximum decline: 41%). Thus, such a decline materialized about once every
eight years.
In order to compute the option price change for, say day 1, we proceed as follows.
We first identify among all traded options the two strike prices that give day 0 prices
closest to 0.5. We then calculate the weight that makes their average price 0.5. Given
this weight, we calculate the weighted average of their prices at day 1 and calculate
from this the change of the price, dP, from day 0 to day 1. Effectively, we compute
price changes of options whose (hypothetical) strike price varies from day to day.
We initially considered all out-of-the-money puts. A first inspection, however,
revealed that the 100er strikes (i.e. 500, 600, 700 etc.) are much more liquid than
put options with other strike prices. We therefore use only these puts. For each
day an option’s strike price and its price change are then calculated according to
the procedure described above. In order to mitigate the influence of changes in the
remaining time to maturity on our analysis, we use for this an “on-the-run” series,
where each quarter we jump to more recently issued options with longer maturity.
As a result, the remaining time to maturity is limited to an interval of between three
and six months.
4.2 Estimated tail risk exposures
We estimate Eq. 3 for each bank using the following specification:
yt
yt
= α0 + α1 xtxt + α2
pt
pt + xt + εt. (4)
9In the more tranquil (low volatility) times of 2006, the average implied strike was around 28% below
the S&P 500 while after June 2007 it was on average around 38% below the S&P 500.
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In Eq. 4 the subindix t indicates time. The market value of the bank and the S&P500
index are denoted by yt and xt, respectively (
yt
yt
and xtxt are hence the returns on
the bank and the market). The term pt denotes the price of a put-option on the S&P
500 index with a strike price xt that is set such that its previous-day-price is a constant
over time (as described in the previous section), xt denotes the (time-varying) strike
price of the option, and εt is an error term that fulfills the classical OLS-assumptions.
We expect α1 in Eq. 4 to be close to one in case banks display similar properties
as other firms in the market. We do not hold any priors about the sign of α2 (note
that γ in the model (3) relates to −α2 in the estimation; high α2 thus indicates less
tail risk). If a bank is similar to the average firm in the market, its γ should be zero.
This is because the bank will then react one-to-one to market movements. Its market
dependence in the tail is then not dif/ferent from its market dependence in normal
times and hence gamma is zero. The existence of systemic risk in the financial system
may suggests that banks display excess market dependence in the tail, that is, γ is
positive (negative α2). However, bail-out expectation may also limit the perceived
exposures of the stocks of banks to a market downturn, in which case we obtain a
negative γ (positive α2).
We estimate Eq. 4 using OLS on daily data. For this we winsorize the dependent
variables at the 2.5% level. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the coefficients on
the 209 bank-level regressions. We can see that the betas are reasonably distributed.
The mean beta is 1.56; banks are thus on average riskier than the market. The
25th and the 75th percentiles are 1.39 and 1.93, respectively. The γ (= −α2) is only
significant in 16.3% of the cases, which is not surprising considering that the γ of
an average firm in the market should be zero. However, we can see that there is
substantial cross-sectional variation in the γ : the 25th and 75th percentiles are −12.2
and −2.8. The mean γ is negative (−7.8), suggesting that that overall factors that
reduce tail risk (relative to the market) dominate.
What can be said about the economic significance of the γ -estimates? For the
β-estimates it is straightforward to interpret their value since a drop in the market by
x% translates into a drop in the stock price by βx%. Such a simple relationship does
not exist for the γ because the return on a put-option is not proportional to the return
on the market. However, in order to get a sense of the economic significance of the
γ -estimates one can do the following exercise. We can consider different scenarios
for (instantaneous) drops in the market index of, say 5, 10, 15, 20%. For these drops,
we can calculate implied put-option price changes (using an option price formula).
We can then use Eq. 3 to calculate the share price return for the average gamma
implied by the put-option change, which is given by the term −γ dpp+x (= α2 dpp+x ).
Finally, we can compare this return to the share price return implied by the average
beta.
Table 1 Summary statistics for 2-factor model. The table summarizes the coefficients from the 209
bank-level 2-factor regressions given by Eq. 4
Mean Stdev 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. Percentage of banks for
which coeff. is significant
Intercept (α0) −0.00010 0.00072 −0.00049 0.00007 0.00035 1.4%
Beta (α1) 1.562 0.562 1.387 1.691 1.928 95.7%
Gamma (−α2) −7.832 8.375 −12.200 −7.721 −2.811 16.3%
Significance level in the last column is 5%
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Some caveats apply to this method. First, when we compute the implied option
price change we keep constant all the other determinants of the option price, while
in reality a significant drop in the index value, for example, is likely to be associated
with a change in volatility as well (most likely an increase in the volatility). Thus,
our calculations may over- or underestimate the real impact on the put-option
price. Second, the OLS coefficients for beta and gamma relate to small changes in
the explanatory variables, while we simulate large changes in these variables. For
the beta-coefficient this issue may be relatively innocent—as it only requires the
relationship between the bank and stock return to be linear over a wide range of
index returns. However, for the gamma this assumption is more problematic. This
is because the price of an out-of-the-money put-option responds non-linearly to
changes in the market. In particular, it becomes more sensitive to the market as the
market gets closer to the strike price (less out-of-the money). Our OLS estimates
of the gamma are based on the less sensitive range (where the index value is far
away from the strike) but for the simulations we make inferences about the more
sensitive range (where the put-option is less out-of-the-money). This may introduce
an additional source of error in our exercise.
We proceed as follows. In order to calculate the expression −γ dpp+x , we assume an
index value equal to the average of the S&P 500 during our sample period. From this
we calculate the strike of the option using the average discount used in our analysis.
We then calculate the implied volatility (using the Black–Scholes formula) which
makes the option price equal to 0.5 (the price used in our regressions). Holding
this volatility constant we can then compute the option price change if the market
drops by a certain amount. Using the sample mean γ , we can then calculate the term
−γ dpp+x , which gives us the share price return induced by the γ -risk. The share price
return induced by the β-risk of the average bank is simply given by the (mean) β
times the drop in the market.
Table 2 summarizes the results for the various scenarios about index drops. The
first column shows the stock return implied by the β-risk, the second column the
return implied by the γ -risk. The third column shows the total implied return. We can
see that for modest index drops, the γ -exposure does not matter a lot. For example,
for an index drop of 5%, the average share price change implied by the gamma is
only 0.6%, compared to an average share price change implied by the beta of −7.8%
(recall that the average beta in our sample is larger than one). However, for larger
Table 2 Economic significance of γ -estimates. The table calculates the share price reaction to
various market crash scenarios. The first column gives the share price reaction implied by the average
beta (= 1.56). The second column gives the share price reaction implied by the average gamma
(= −7.82). The third column gives the combined share price reaction. The last column gives the
difference in the share price response of a bank at the 25% quantile and at the 75% quantile of the
gamma-distribution
Scenario Stock price Stock price Total stock price Difference in stock price
index return implied return implied return for average return between 25% and
return for average β for average γ β and γ 75% γ -quantile bank
−0.05 −0.078 0.006 −0.072 0.007
−0.1 −0.156 0.020 −0.136 0.023
−0.15 −0.234 0.048 −0.186 0.056
−0.2 −0.312 0.102 −0.210 0.120
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index drops the importance of the gamma raises. For example, for an index drop of
20%, the change implied by the gamma is 10.2%, while the beta-implied change is
−31.2%. The increasing importance of the γ -exposure for larger index drops reflects
the non-linear dependence of the put-option price on the underlying: as we get closer
to the strike, the sensitivity (delta) of the (out-of-the money) put increases.
Besides this exercise (which compares the average γ -risk with the average β-risk),
it is also informative to study how important the cross-sectional variations in γ -risk
are in economic terms. This matters for a regulator who wants to know whether a
bank that has a high γ -risk relative to its peers really has much more tail risk. For
this we have calculated in the last column of the table the difference in the implied
share price return for a bank that has a gamma equal to the 25% quantile of the
distribution with the one of a bank at the 75% quantile of the distribution. As before,
it turns out that for smaller index drops the gamma does not matter a lot (for a 5%
drop the difference in the return is about 0.7% between the two banks). However,
for larger drops, the difference becomes important. For example, when the market
drops by 20%, a bank with a gamma at the 75% quantile of the γ -distribution drops
by 12% more than a bank at the 25% quantile.
Figure 1 shows next the gammas plotted against bank size. It can be seen that
there is considerable variation. There also seems to be a pattern of large banks having
lower tail risk.
An important question is whether our tail risk measure really adds anything in
terms of informational content to the normal beta. For example, it may simply be
that the banks with large tail risk are also banks that have a large beta. In this case,
estimating the tail risk beta separately is of little value. To shed light on this question
we study how gammas relate to betas. In order to avoid potential interdependencies
between beta and gamma arising when they are estimated in the same regression, we
estimate for this betas that are obtained from a standard one-factor model (that is,
without put-options) of the following form:
yt
yt
= α0 + α1 xtxt + εt. (5)
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Table 3 Summary statistics for 1-factor model. The table summarizes the coefficients from the 209
bank-level 1-factor regressions given by Eq. 5
Mean Stdev 25th perc. 50th perc. 75th perc. Percentage of banks for
which coeff. is significant
Intercept (α0) −0.00016 0.00072 −0.00055 0.00002 0.00031 1%
Beta (α1) 1.476 0.529 1.329 1.613 1.832 97%
Significance level in last column is 5%
Table 3 provides summary statistics for β’s estimated from this 1-factor model,
showing that although the mean beta is now somewhat smaller (1.48 instead of 1.56),
the overall distribution is similar to the one from the 2-factor model.
Figure 2 plots the banks’ gammas against market betas. The scatter plot shows
that higher gammas cannot simply explained by higher betas. In fact, there is a strong
negative relationship between beta and gamma.
This negative relationship has the following interpretation. Since the gamma is
estimated from a regression that also includes the market, it measures tail risks
over and above the tail-dependence implied by the beta. In other words: a positive
gamma implies that a bank has more tail risk than its beta would suggest. A negative
relationship between beta and gamma thus means that low beta banks have more tail
risk than their beta would indicate (and vice versa for high beta banks). Thus, there
is convergence in the tail: banks’ risk exposures in the tail are more similar than the
ones in normal times.
A potential explanation for the negative relationship is so-called tail risk strate-
gies, which produce steady returns in normal periods but actually expose the banks
to severe downturns. For example, an institution that writes protection in the CDS
market receives in normal periods a relatively safe stream of insurance premia.
However, in a large recession many exposures will simultaneously default and large
losses may materialize for this institution. Many trading strategies, such as the ones
exploiting apparent arbitrage relations, create similar pay-off distributions. If banks
that have low beta (and hence also low tail risk) tend to source additional tail-
risk through such means, this could explain our finding. Another explanation for
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this negative correlation is that highly profitable institutions that operate in risky
environments protect their franchise, for example by buying protection in the CDS
market or by imposing a less fragile capital structure. Yet another interpretation is
that it is simply difficult for banks to avoid exposure to systemic events. Thus while
banks may differ substantially in their normal business risk, their tail exposure may
be rather similar.
We can classify banks into different risk profiles using the two dimensions of Fig. 2.
Specifically, we allocate banks to four groups relative to a benchmark bank with
β = 1 and γ = 0. This creates the following categorization in Fig. 2:
1. Upper-right quadrant (Quadrant I): Banks with high normal times (β > 1) and
high tail risk (γ > 0).
2. Upper-left quadrant (Quadrant II): Banks with high normal times (β > 1) and
low tail risk (γ < 0).
3. Lower-left quadrant (Quadrant III): Banks with low normal times (β < 1) and
low tail risk (γ < 0).
4. Lower-right quadrant (Quadrant IV): Banks with low normal times (β < 1) and
high tail risk (γ > 0).
Table 4 lists the top-10 banks (in terms of their average asset size during the
sample period) for each of the four risk profiles. We can see that all the very large
Table 4 Classification of banks according to their risk profiles. The table lists the ten largest banks
for each quadrant in Fig. 2
Quadrant I (β > 1 and γ > 0) Quadrant II (β > 1 and γ < 0)
Name of BHC Log(Assets) Name of BHC Log(Assets)
UNIONBANCAL CORP 17.80888 CITIGROUP INC 21.38418
W HOLDING CO INC 16.65328 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 21.16085
SANTANDER BANCORP 16.00912 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 21.11819
AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 15.47797 WACHOVIA CORP 20.33326
ITLA CAPITAL CORP 15.06647 WELLS FARGO & CO 20.09249
FIRST FINL BANCORP INC 15.03965 U S BANCORP 19.23489
INTEGRA BANK CORP 14.91511 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 19.00746
REPUBLIC BANCORP INC 14.90969 NATIONAL CITY CORP 18.79059
CITY HOLDING COMPANY 14.73645 STATE STREET CORP 18.67159
WASHINGTON BANC. INC 14.72756 CAPITAL ONE FINC. CORP 18.65735
Quadrant III (β < 1 and γ < 0) Quadrant IV (β < 1 and γ > 0)
Name of BHC Log(Assets) Name of BHC Log(Assets)
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSH 16.58151 EUROBANCSHARES INC 14.75665
PENNSYLVANIA COMM BANC. 14.45603 FARMERS CAPITAL BANK 14.44821
CADENCE FINANCIAL CORP 14.41014 MBT FINANCIAL CORP 14.26376
FNB UNITED CORP 14.37156 FIRST UNITED CORP 14.16776
STATE BANCORP 14.30592 TIB FINANCIAL CORP 14.11398
SOUTHERN CMNTY FINL CORP 14.22843 FIRSTBANK CORP 13.99682
BEVERLY HILLS BANCORP INC 14.20897 PAB BANKSHARES INC 13.95141
BANCORP RHODE ISLAND INC 14.2045 SMITHTOWN BANCORP INC 13.93047
GATEWAY FINANCIAL HLDGS 14.19157 GERM. AMER. BANCORP 13.90569
CAPITAL BANK CORP 14.16501 CAMCO FINANCIAL CORP 13.86312
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banks are in Quadrant II (high beta − low gamma). This is good news to the extent
that it suggests that many of the large banks have tail-risks that do not exceed their
normal times risk. In addition, due to their high-normal times risk these banks are
likely to be already on the radar screen of regulators. We can also see that some of
large banks are in Quadrant I (high beta − high gamma). These banks have excess
tail-risk, but are probably under (well-deserved) regulatory scrutiny because they
also have large betas. The probably most interesting quadrant—from a regulatory
perspective—is Quadrant IV (low beta − high gamma). These are the banks were
normal times risk understates their tail risk and which may hence fall through
the cracks. Regulators should pay more attention to these banks. It is, however,
comforting that the largest banks do not belong to these category. In fact, the banks
in this category tend be much smaller than in the previous two quadrants. Finally, in
Quadrant III (low beta − low gamma) we have the relatively unproblematic banks.
These banks tend to be also small in size.
5 Determinants of bank tail risk
In this section we study whether and how a bank’s business activities relate to its
tail risk. The most obvious way to do this is by regressing (estimated) gammas
upon a number of balance sheet variables that represent various banking activities.
This two step method, however, has the disadvantage that the estimation is not
efficient as information from the first step (estimating the gammas) is not used in the
second step.
For this reason we estimate the relationship in one step.10 We amend Eq. 3 to
allow a bank’s put option sensitivity to vary with a certain bank activity, say B,
relative to its sample mean (Bˆ). In addition, we also interact the S&P 500 return with
the balance sheet variable B to take into account that general market sensitivities
may also differ depending on bank activities. We obtain the modified equation:
dy(x)
y
= α + (β + θ(B − Bˆ))dx
x
− (γ + δ(B − Bˆ)) dp
p + x . (6)
The coefficient δ in this equation gives us the relationship between a bank’s gamma
and activity B (the equivalent of the coefficient of a regression of estimated gammas
on B), evaluated at the mean. Since we are interested in several determinants of bank
































pt + xt + εi,t.
(7)
where j denotes a bank activity. Our coefficients of interest in this estimation are the
α
j
4. A positive α
j
4 implies that balance activity j decreases tail risk, while a negative
coefficient implies that it increases tail risk.
We estimate Eq. 7 by means of pooled OLS. Table 5 presents the implied
coefficients for the determinants of gamma, δ j (= −α j4). Note that a positive
10The two-step method, however, yielded very similar results.
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coefficient in the table implies that the activity increases tail risk.11 The first column
contains the results from a regression with some basic bank characteristics: size
(measured by the log of total assets), the loan-to-asset ratio and the leverage ratio
(measured by the debt-to-asset ratio). Size is negatively related to tail risk exposure.
This may indicate that markets perceive large banks as being too-big-to-fail (TBTF).
The loan-to-asset ratio is also negatively related to a bank’s tail risk exposure. This
finding is in line with other recent findings: both De Jonghe (2010) and Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that traditional banking activities are less risky than
non-traditional activities. The last variable considered is the leverage ratio. Although
a higher leverage ratio is often associated with more default risk, it does not come
out significant here (we return to this later).
Column two focuses on banks’ lending activities by including proxies for loan qual-
ity and profitability. Among the loan quality proxies only the loan growth variable
is significant, indicating a positive relationship with tail risk. This is consistent with
the idea that a bank may only grow faster at the cost of lowering lending quality,
and hence may become more exposed in a downturn.12 We also find that a higher
interest rate on the loans is associated with less tail risk, which can be explained
by the fact that this indicates a higher profitability of banks, thus exposing them
less to a crash in the market. Additionally, we include the return of assets (ROA)
to capture the returns from other (partly non-traditional) asset activities. We find a
positive relationship with tail risk, which is consistent with other recent findings (e.g.,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2010).13
Next, we turn to the influence of other assets. In column three we include held-to-
maturity securities, for-sale securities and trading assets (all scaled by total assets).
Only trading assets turn out significant, and only at the 10% level. At this point,
one has to keep in mind that non-traditional activities are likely to be negatively
correlated with traditional activities (banks may specialize in either), which may
create multicollinearity problems and hence affect the estimates. Therefore, in
column four we use the ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets
(C&I Loans/TA) instead of the loan-to-asset ratio (the traditional activity) as it is
less correlated with the non-traditional activities. The result is that trading assets
and for-sale securities now contribute very significantly to tail risk. Held-to-maturity
securities have a positive coefficient as well, but its magnitude and significance is
lower. The C&I-loans-to-asset ratio is insignificant, similar to the loan-to-asset ratio
in column three.
It is often argued that non-traditional activities increase (tail) risk exposure. In
columns five and six, we will analyze which role financial innovations play among the
non-traditional activities. First, we investigate securitization and asset sales activities.
In addition to the total value of securitization and asset sales (both scaled by total
assets) we also include the internal and external credit exposure arising from these
11The choice of the explanatory variables is motivated by the empirical literature on bank risk in
normal times, see, for example, Stiroh (2006).
12This is in line with other studies, which identify loan growth as a main driver of risk (see, for
example, Foos et al. 2009).
13Note that the interest income from loans is a part of the ROA so that potential multicollinearity
issues could affect the results. However, tests in which we split the ROA into returns from loans and
returns from remaining assets revealed that this is not a problem.
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activities. The internal credit exposure arises from a bank’s own securitization or
asset sale activities via recourse and other credit enhancing agreements between the
bank and its special purpose vehicle (SPV). An external credit exposure can arise if
a bank provides credit enhancements to other banks’ securitization structures.
Column five shows that only the external credit exposure variable is significant
and positive. This is in line with our prior findings as external credit exposure is new
credit exposure taken on in addition to existing exposure. Moreover, such exposure
(for example, from credit enhancements) only materializes under relatively adverse
scenarios, and hence should be related to tail risk. The insignificance of a bank’s
own securitization and asset sale activities may indicate that opposing forces are at
work. On the one hand, securitization and asset sales are, by themselves, of course a
mean of off-loading risk to other market participants, making a bank less risky.14 In
particular, if the bank keeps the equity tranche but sells senior tranches it sheds tail
risk relative to normal period risk. On the other hand, recent experience has shown
that these activities induced banks to take on more risk.15 In addition, although the
credit exposure seemingly disappeared from the balance sheet to the SPV (which is
legally independent), the market might expect that this separation does not survive
if the SPV encounters large losses. A bank might buy back assets from its SPV in
order to protect its reputation and customer base (as happened in the case of Bear
Stearns). Therefore, the credit exposure (which is mostly tail risk exposure) may not
be effectively removed by securitization.
Column six focuses on banks’ derivatives activities. Based on the available data,
we can make the distinction between derivatives that are held for trading purposes
and derivatives that are held for other purposes (most likely hedging). A priori one
would expect that the latter would reduce tail risk. The expected effect for derivative
trading is less clear cut. Resulting counterparty risk (which tends to materialize in tail
risk scenarios) may, for example, create an increase in tail risk exposure. The results
in column six show that derivatives held for trading contribute to tail risk, while the
other derivatives do not seem to affect it. The latter is somewhat surprising but may
be explained by the fact that only some of these derivatives are used for hedging and
that they create counterparty risk as well.
The last column takes a closer look at the importance of capital structure for
tail risk. In column one we found that the leverage ratio does not contribute to
tail risk exposure. We now include information on the share of deposits and the
composition of deposits. In the last column of Table 5, in addition to the variables
from column one, we consider the deposit-to-liabilities ratio and the ratio of time
deposits above $100,000 to domestic deposits.16 Time deposits above $100,000 were
not insured during our sample period, which makes them similar to wholesale
funding, as both funding sources might be prone to runs. The results in column seven
show that the leverage ratio is again not significant. Insignificance also obtains for the
14There is evidence from bank stock prices supporting this channel, see for example, Wu et. al.
(2011). However, there is also evidence that securitized assets have lower risk (Ambrose et al. 2005);
thus the relative riskiness of a bank’s portfolio may increase.
15For example, Franke and Krahnen (2007) and Nijskens and Wagner (forthcoming) find that
securitization increases a bank’s beta.
16The FR Y-9C reports do not contain information on deposits in foreign subsidiaries, hence we scale
by domestic deposits.
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deposit-to-liabilities ratio. However, the time deposits above $100,000 do contribute
positively and significantly to tail risk. Since these deposits are subject to withdrawal
risks similar to wholesale funding, this result is consistent with Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2010) who find that wholesale funding increases bank risk.17
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a forward-looking method to measure tail risk exposures
at banks. Tail risk is defined as a bank’s exposure to a large negative market shock
and it is measured by estimating a bank’s share price sensitivity to changes in far
out-of-the-money put options on the market, correcting for market movements
themselves. Because far out-of-the-money put options on the market only pay out if
the market crashes, changes in their prices reflect changes in the perceived likelihood
and severity of a crash. The estimated sensitivities, in turn, represent the market’s
perception of exposures to a hypothetical crash, making them a truly forward-looking
measure. Another attractive feature of this measure is that it does not require the
actual observation of tail risk events since it identifies banks’ tail risk exposure
through changes in expected market tail risk. Our measure is also relatively easy
to estimate as it basically comes from an amended market regression.
The application to U.S. bank holding companies yields several interesting facts
about their tail risk exposures. For example, (excess) tail risk seems to be negatively
correlated with the CAPM share price beta. This suggests that banks which appear
relatively safe in normal times (that is, have a low beta) are actually riskier than their
beta would suggest. We also find that the impact of non-traditional activities on tail
risk depends on whether they leave assets on the balance sheets or not. In the former
case they increase tail risk, while in the latter they do not. Our results also suggest that
leverage itself does not increase tail risk, but will do so if it comes through uninsured
deposits.
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